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That marriage made important changes in property rights is well
known to anyone acquainted with the position of the married
woman at common law. By common law rules, and without any
act on the part of the persons concerned other than going through
the required marriage ceremony, the husband became the owner
of the wife's chattels, acquired an interest in her land and was
empowered to reduce to possession her choses in action. While
this state of affairs has been changed by legislation, the statutes,
passed differ in the thoroughness with which the old rules have
been abolished. Moreover in several of our states, as well as in
some of the European countries, that form of common ownership
by husband and wife known as community property is in force;
i system which differs both from the common law scheme and its
itatutory successor-individual ownership by each spouse of his
or her own property, except for statutory rights of dower.
Conflict of Laws questions arise concerning both the property
owned by the parties at the time of their marriage and that acquired subsequently thereto. A of Michigan marries B of California. Each has possessions both in and out of the home state. What
law determines the rights each acquires by reason of the marriage
in the pr9perty of the other ? Suppose after some years in Michigan, they move to Louisiana and then make further acquisitions.
What effect, if any, does the change make in property owned at
*
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the time of their removal; by what law are rights in further additions to their wealth to be governed.
The situation will first be discussed on the assumption that the
parties have made no express contract with regard to their property.

IMMOVABLES
It is a general rule that all questions concerning the creation
of interests in land are governed by the lex rei sitae. It is to be
expected, then, that the law of the situs of the land will determine
what, if any, interest one spouse gets in the other's land as an
incident to the marriage relation, and such is the law.- And the
law'where the property is situated determines whether it is to be2
considered as immovable to be governed by the law of the situs.
An important practical limitation of the effect of this rule is
shown in a line of decisions of which the Washington case of Brookman v. Durkee3 is typical. A husband, domiciled in a common
law state, there acquires money which he invests in land in a
jurisdiction where the community system of marital property is
in force. At common law, the money belongs solely to the husband.
Does the wife acquire an interest in the land in the second state?
The answer is uniformly in the negative,4 even though the land was
purchased by the husband with the proceeds of property originally
belonging to the wife, title to which he acquired by the marriage
under the common law rule.- This is entirely sound, and for the
reason generally given; the husband's title is not lost by moving
his money across a state line and turning it into some other form
of property. The same limitation is effective to protect an interest
acquired in a community property state. Thus when a husband
wrongfully took funds belonging to the community from Louisiana
and invested them in Missouri land, taking title in his own name,
1 Nott v. Nott, 111 La. 1028, 36 So. 109; Newcomer v. Orem,. 2 Md. 297, 56 Am.
Dec. 717; Vertner v. Humphreys, 14 S. & M. (Miss.) 130; Re Majot, 199 N. Y.
29, 92 N. E. 402, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 780; Heidenlielmer v. Loring, 6 Tex. Civ. App.
560, 26 S. W. 99. In re DeNicols, [1900,1 2 Ch. Div. 410, applied the French rule
to English realty on the basis of a tacit contract. This point receives discussion
below. Prior to the statute of 1852, the community property rule was not applied
to real property acquired in Louisana by nonresidents not married there. See
Dohan v. Murdock, 41 La. Ann. 494, 6 So. 131 and Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591,
15 L. ed 497. Louisana law governed, but a different rule was applicable to -residents
and nonresidents.
2 Newcomer v. Orem, supra; Vertner v. Humphreys, supra.
S 46 Wash. 578. 90 Pac. 914, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 921, followed In Witherill v.
Fraunfelter, 46 Wash. 699, 91 Pac. 1086.
4 In addition to the cases in note 3, see In re Burrow's Estate, 136 Cal. 113, 68
Pee. 488; Ellington v. Harris, 127 Ga. 85, 56 S. B. 134; Blethen v. Bonner, 30
Tex. Civ. App. 585, 71 S. W. 290; Thayer v. Clarke, 77 S. W. 1050, 81 S. W. 1274.
McDaniel v. Hartley, - Tex. Civ. App. - , 42 S. W. 323.
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he was compelled to hold the title in trust to protect the wife's
interest.6
Whether or not a debt is to be regarded ag a separate debt or as
community debt, and thus chargeable to the community land, byt
the law of the situs, depends upon the law where the claim arose,
even though it would have7 been a commiility debt had it arisen
where the land is located.
MOVABLES
In cases where the question concerns other property interests
than "immovables," which term is generally equivalent to interests in land,8 there must be considered separately the interests
which spouses acquire in each other's movable property owned
at the time of the marriage, and that subsequently acquired. The
rule here is that upon marriage each spouse gets such interest in
the movable property then owned by the other as the law of the
matrimonial domicile provides, no matter where the property is
located at the time.9 The place where the marriage occurs is not
material. 18 To explain the result by saying that the lex domvicilii
governs because this personal property has no actual location is to
state that which is not true in fact. But a sound explanation
might well be rested upon the convenience of such a rule. Just as
in the case of intestate succession it is less complicated to have
the entire personal estate pass according to some one rule, so
here it seems convenient to have one test for determining mutual
property rights of husband and wife. In the absence of legislative
determination to the contrary by the soverign where the property
has its situs, one uniform rule, that of the matrimonial domicile,
governs.
Marital rights in movable property, it is said, are determined by
the law of the matrimonial domicile. What is the matrimonial
6 Depas -v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88. See Bonati v0. Welsch, 24 N. Y.
157. In Smith v. McAtee, 27 Md. 420, 92 Am. Dec. 641, a married woman, domiciled in Illinois, was left an interest in land in Maryland. The land was sold in
court proceedings and the money from the sale ordered held to her sole and separate
use. It was held that she was entitled to the protection of the Maryland statute
by which the separate property of the wife was not liable for debts of the husband.
1 La Selle .0. Woolery, 11 Wash. 337, 39 Pac. 663; id. 14 Wash. 70, 44 Pac. 115;
Clark .v. Eltlnge, 29 Wash. 215, 69 Pac. 736.
8 As Dicey, 3rd ed. p. 76, states It, immovables are equivalent to realty, with the
addition of chattels real or leaseholds; movables are equivalent to personalty, with
the omission of chattels real.
0ason v. Fuller, 36 Conn. 160; Lyon v. Knott, 26 Miss. 548; Harrall v. Wallis,
37 N. J. Eq. 458, affd. sub nom. Harral v. Harral, 39 N. J. Eq. 279; Craycroff
v. Morehead, 67 N. C. 422; see also cases cited, note 14. The court evidently
lost sight of this rule or refused to apply It in Locke'v. McPherson, 163 Mo. 493,
63 S. W. 726, 85 Am. St. Rep. 546.
20 Harral v. Harral, 39 N. J. Eq. 279 and cases cited.
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domicile? The natural meaning of the term is that it indicates
the domicile of the husband at the time of the marriage. This
domicile becomes that of the wife, upon marriage, by operation
of law. There are authorities which define it differently, however.
The matrimonial domicile is said to be the place where the parties
intend, at the time of their marriage, to establish their residence,
assuming that their intention is carried out within a reasonable
time. 1' If the previous domicile of the husband is shown, this
will be regarded as the matrimonial domicile, it is said, in the
absence of any thing showing a contrary intention.12
This peculiar innovation in the law of domicile goes back to Mr.
Justice Story's work on the Conflict of Laws. He discussed the
doctrines of the continental law writers who had made pronouncements upon the subject and concluded, in the absence of common
law authority, with a cautious venture that "it is not too much to
affirm that a contrary doctrine will scarcely hereafter be established."'-3 Subsequent writers and judges have repeated the language. The conception is contrary to well settled and well estab-.
lished rules of domicile which always require physical presence
and intent to establish a home in a place to condur before a
domicile of choice can be acquired. It leaves property rights
unsettled until the requisite "reasonable time" has elapsed in which
the parties can carry out their intention to settle at the place of
intended abode. In most of the cases, the "matrimonial domicile"
whose law governed marital rights in property was in fact that
of the husband at the time of marriage." In the only case found
in which it appeared that the intention was to establish a domicile
elsewhere, the applicability of the rule was denied.15 In spite of
verbal deference to a wider meaning it seems safe to say that
matrimonial domicile, as the term is actually applied, means the
domicile of the husband at the time of the marriage of the parties. 6
The interests thus acquired by one spouse in the property of the
other, if a vested property right, continue so far as this property
is concerned, even though the domicile of the spouses is subseU 5 R. C. L. 1007; 85 Am. St. Rep. 557, Story, Conflict of Laws, 7th ed, § 186;
Wharton, same, 3rd ed., § 190; 57 L. R. A. 360, note.
12 57 L. R. A. 360, note.
12 Story, 7th ed. §§ 191-199.
" In addition to authorities in note
9, see Jaffray v. McGougb, 83 Ala. 202,
3 So. 594; Parrett v. Palmer, 89 Ind. App. 356, 35 N. E.

713;1 Townes v. Durbin,

(Ky.) 3 Metc. 352; Routh v. Routh, 9 Rob. 224; Fisher v. Fisher, 2 La. Ann. 774;
Walker v. Duverger, 4 La. Ann; 569; Arendell v. Arendell, 10 La. Ann. 566; Mason
v. Homer, 105 Mass. 116; Kneeland v. Ensley, (Tenn.) Meigs. 620.
" McIntyre v. Chappell, 4 Tex. 187.

The Louisiana court has, however, been con-

sistent in clear enunciation of the special rule for this particular kind of domicile.
' Accord, Minor, Conflict of Laws, § 81. See "Matrimonial Domicile," 27 Yale
L. Jour. 49, where authorities are fully analyzed.
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quently changed to another state.1" Interesting questions of constitutional law, not yet answered by authority, are raised when
an attempt is made by the state where domicile is subsequently
acquired by the husband and wife to extend its local rule of marital
property to that owned by the parties prior to the acquisition of
a domicile therein. 8
Rights in Movables Acquired after Marriage.
Movable property acquired by husband or wife subsequent to
the marriage, but while the domicile of the husband at the time
of the marriage is still retained, is governed, as to the rights
of the spouses, by this law. 9 Suppose they then change their domicile, and acquire more property at their new home. As seen
above, the move does not divest rights in property previously acquired. Does the law of the former or the newly acquired domicile
govern the respective rights in the property acquired after acquisition of the new home? The point came before the House of
Lords in the case of De Nicols v. Curlier. 0 The husband and wife,
citizens of and domiciled in France, married there, without making
any express contract about property. Subsequently they came to
England where they became domiciled and the husband was naturalized. He became the proprietor of a famous restaurant and
amassed a fortune. By the law of France, parties who married
17 Jaffray v. McGough, 83 Ala. 202, 3 So. 594; Thorn v. Weatherly, 50 Ark.
237, 7 S. W. 33; Kraemer v. Kraemer, 52 Cal. 302; Lichtenber U. Graham, 50 Ind.
288; Cressey v. Tatom. 9 Ore. 541; Oliver v. Robertson, 41 Tex. 422. See Bond V.
Cummings, 70 Me. 125. These are cases where the right of the husband, vesting
under the law of the matrimonial domicile, were recognized in a second state. The
same protection is given to a vested interest which a wife has acquired in separate
property. Doss -. Campbell, 19 Ala. 590; Parrott v. Nemmo, 28 Ark. 351; Grote V.
Pace, 71 Ga. 231; Powell v. DeBlaine, 23 Tex. 66; Brown v. Daugherty, 120 Fed.
526. The ihterest thus to be protected in the second state must have vested in
the person seeking its protection. Lyon v. Knott, 26 Miss. 548; Powell v. DeBlaine,
23 Tex. 66.
3 See 10 Calif. L. Rev. 154 discussing the 1917 amendment to § 164 of the California Civil Code.
" Kraemer v. Kraemer, 52 Cal. 302; Newcomer v. Orem, 2 Md. 297, 56 Am.
Dec. 717; Lyon v. Knott, 26 Miss. 548; Davis v. Zimmerman, 67 Pa. 70; Dicey,
Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed., p. 690. Choses in action, as well as tangible chattels
are within the rules herein discussed. Jones v. Aetna Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 501; Frank
v. Hirsh, 3 App. D. C. 491; Dempster v. Stephen, 63 Ill. App. 126. In Graham V.
First National Bank, 84 N. Y. 393, 38 Am. Rep. 528, a bank which bad paid, in
Virginia, the proper place of payment, dividends on shares of stock in the bank
owned by the wife, was held to be discharged from further liability by such payment.
The common law prevailed in Virginia, but the husband and wife were domiciled in
Maryland. The case does not decide that the husband could keep the money, only
that the bank fulfilled its obligation in paying him.
Claims for a personal tort cause difficulty. In Williams v. Pope Mfg. Co., 52 La.
Ann. 1417, 27 So. 851, a claim for false imprisonment was held not to be "property
acquired within the state," so as to make the community property rule of Louisiana
applicable to it. In Snashall v. Met. R. Co., 8 Mackey 399, 10 L. R. A. 746, a
claim for personal injury was held not to be property so that the statutory right
of action given by Wisconsin where a wife resided would give her the action for
injuries sustained in the District of Columbia. The correctness of the decision seems
doubtful. A question of procedure, as whether the wife sues alone or must have the
husband join is a matter of the Zex fori. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Humble, 181 U. S.
57, 21 Sup. Ct. 526.
[1900] A. C. 21.
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without express agreement as to property became subject to the
system of community of goods.21 The husband left a will by which
he disposed of the whole estate as if he were the sole owner. The
widow claimed her share as of a community and the House of
Lords decided in her favor as to the personal chattels. The basis
of the decision was a tacit agreement that the community property
rule should govern. Since the parties could have expressly contracted as to marital property rights, it was thought that sdfch
an express contract was of no superior force as evidencing the
agreement "than a known consequence of entering into the marriage status." In further litigation concerning the same estate
this decisoin was followed; notwithstanding the statute of frauds,
in determining the marital rights in the English land-and for
the same reason, that there was a tacit agreement between the
parties that the community of goods rules should govern.22
There seems great difficulty involved in the position thus taken.
To say that the parties contracted with reference to marital rights
by accepting the provisions of the law in that respect when they
did not in fact make a contract is to say that which is not in
accord with the facts. The doctrine assumes a knowledge of the
legal effect of marriage which few laymen possess. The addition
of the adjective "tacit" brings it no nearer the facts. There are
many incidents of the marriage relation, especially when common
law doctrines are (or were) in full flower, which it is absurd to
pretend are matters of contract between the parties. The husband's authority to discipline the wife may serve as an instance.
The tacit contract explanation is not applied in other- situations
where it would be as appropriate as in determining marital property rights. If one dies without a will, we do not say he tacitly accepted the statute of distributions, but that the statute governs
because he in fact died intestate. If one commits a battery upon
another, his liability to pay damages is not a matter of contract,
tacit or otherwise, but a legal obligation imposed regardless of
his consent. It seems more accurate to say that rights in marital
property are given by the law as an incident of the marriage
relation. It must be stated, however, that the tacit contract
Elaboration of this system of ownership Is outside the scope of this discussion.
For notes on various phases, see 24 Harv. I. Rev. 652; 11 Col. L. Rev. 668; 10
Calif. I. R. 154.
On its theory, see discussions In 35 Harv. L. Rev. 47; and
in general, Ballinger on Community Property.
22 In re de Nicols, [1900] 2 Ch. Div. 410.
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theory, as applied to marital property, has found favor with some
23
authorities.
De Nicols v. Curlier has been explained on the ground that it
proceeded solely on the finding that the settlement made by the
French law must be deemed equivalent to an express contract to
adopt it. Since the foreign law was only found as a fact, "it may
in the future fail to be shown even for France; and certainly
it may fail to be shown in the case of other countries." 2' 4 And
the last edition of Dicey25 states the English rule to be that where
there is no marriage contract and where there is a subsequent
change of domicile, "the rights of husband and wife to each
other's movables are governed by the law of the new domicile."
The American cases are quite uniform in holding that the law of
the domicile at the time the property is acquired governs, not
that of the original matrimonial domicile nor of any intermediate
domicile. 6 Even if there were a tacit contract, it is said in a leading case, it would still be controlled by the positive laws of the
country into which the parties might remove.2 7
The language used- in the cases is that the law of the domicile
governs. This ignores the effect of a different rule where the
property is actually located when acquired. In most of the cases
the point is not raised; either the situs of the property was the
domicile of the parties or no difference in the laws of the two was
shown. But the domiciliary law has been applied where it difered
from the law of the situs. 5 The correctness of the result must depend upon some other reason than the outworn fiction that personal property has no location apart from its owner. That it
does have an independent situs is recognized in many other situations. It may well be, however, that it is convenient to have subsequent acquisitions governed by a single rule for ownership, just
as one rule applies to the acquisitions of marital rights of property
owned at the time of the marriage, regardless of its location. A

= See Story, Conflict of Laws, 7th ed., § 147 et seq. (but compare § 190) ; Wharton,
§ 190; Westlake, Private International Law, 5th ed., 74 et seq.
' Baty, Polarized Law, 96.
Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed. p. 691.
Birmingham Water Works Co. v. Hume, 121 Ala. 168. 25 So. 806; Saul v.
His Creditors, 5 Martin (N. S.) 569, 16 Am. Dec. 212, Lorenzen's Cas. -;
Hicks
v.

Pope, 8 La.

554, 28 Am. Dec.

142; Muus v.

Muus. 29 Minn. 115; Re Majot,

199 N. Y. 29, 92 N. E. 402, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 780 (see comment in 10 Col. L.
Rev. 147); McCollum v. Smith, (Tenn.) Meigs 342, 33 Am. Dec. 147; Castro v.
Illies, 22 Tex. 479, 73 Am. Dee. 277.
2 Saul v. His Creditors, supra.
2 Hicks .v. Pope, 8 La. 554, 25 Am. Dec, 142; Pearle v. Hansborough, 9 Humph.
(Tenn.) 426; Edrington v,. Mayfleld, 5 Tex. 363. But see language in Shumway
v. Leakey, 67. Cal. 458, 8 Pac. 12
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statute could presumably change the rule so as to make its local
laws applicable to all property withing its borders."
Effect of Express Contract.
Cases involving the effect of contracts on marital property
rights are not numerous in the American reports, due probably to
the comparative infrequency of such transactions in this country.
The contract, if valid by the proper law, 0 will be held valid everywhere, and will govern the rights of the parties, unless for some
reason it stands prohibited by the law where it is sought to be
enforced.31 Story's statement to this effect 82 has been the subject
of frequent judicial citation.3 3 The effect of the agreement in
creating an interest in foreign land will, following the usual rule,
be governed by the lex rei sitae.3 4
Some apparent difficulty arises in the decisions where the property concerned is acquired subsequently to the contract in another
jurisdiction than the matrimonial domicile, especially if at the
time of acquisition the parties have acquired a new domicile. If
the agreement, to use the language of Story, "speaks fully to the
very point." 3 5 it will govern subsequent acquisitions as well as
property owned at the time of the marriage. Whether the contract is broad enough to include such property seems nothing more
than a problem of interpretation-the determination of the intent of the parties from the language they have used and the
29 See Texas & P. R. Co. v. Humble, 181 U. S. 57, 21 Sup. Ct 526.
For the
Louisiana rule, see Williams v. Pope Mfg. Co., 52. La. Ann. 1417. 27 So. S51.
20 This would seem to be governed by the same rules that determined the validity
of any other contract, a subject on which the authorities are In confusion. In
Decouche v. Savetier, 3 Johns. Ch. 190, 8 Am.Dec. 478 it was said to be the lex loci
contractus which governed. See cases collected in .57 L. R. A. 368 for this phase
of the matter.
31 See Dicey, Conflict of Laws, 3rd. ed. 685 et seq. The cases cited in following
notes all expressly declare the proposition or assume it as a starting point In
Caruth v. Caruth, 128 Ia. 121, N. W. husband and wife made a contract
in Illinois which was apparently valid there. The husband died domiciled in Iowa,
leaving personal property.
An Iowa statute declared that neither spouse had such
interest in the property of the othen as could be the subject of a contract between
them. This the court said was in effect a statute of descent and distribution so that
in spite of a contract excluding her the widow could claim her statutory share in the
husband's estate.
32 Story on Conflict of Laws, § 143 and § 184.
Story goes on to say that such
contract "will act directly on movable property everywhere.
But as to Inmovable
property, In a foreign territory, It will at most confer only a right of action, to be
enforced according to the jurisprudence rei sitae." Reason or authority for this
distinction is not given, nor does it seem to be discussed in the cases. It seems
difficult to see how in case of either type of property more than an enforceable
claim arises. See 13 Harv. L. Rev. 601.
3 Long v. Hess, 154 Ill.
482, 40 N. E. 335; Kleb v. Kleb, 70 N. J. Eq. 305, 62
AtI. 396, affirmed in 71 N. J. Eq. 787, 65 AtI. 1118; Castro v. Illies, 22 Tex. 479,
73 Am. Dec. 277; Fuss v. Fuss, 24 Wis. 356, 1 Am. Rep. 180.
84 Heine v. Mechanics & Traders Ins. Co., 45 La. Ann. 770, 13 So. 1; Richardson
v. De Giverville, 107 Mo. 422, 17 S. W. 974.
1 Conflict of Laws, f 143.
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circumstances under which the transaction was entered into. 8
In several of the cases there seems a marked disinclination to hold
subsequently acquired foreign property, especially land, within
the scope of the agreement,17 though more recent authority rejects
the notion that such property must be specifically mentioned in
order to be affected by the contract.3 8

W

Thus in Le Breton v. Miles, 8 Paige 261, the contract though made in New
York was expressed in the French language between persons who declared their
intention to live in France. It provided for a form of marital property ownership
well known to the French law. In saying that the contract was governed by the law
of France the court surely meant no more than that it would look to French law
to see what the parties were endeavoring to effect by their agreement. The same
may be said of Mueller v. Mueller, 127 Ala. 356, 28 So. 465. See also McLeod v.
Board, 30 Tex. 238, 94 Am. Dec. 301.
31 Besse v. Pellochoux, 73 Ill. 285, 24 Am. Rep. 242; Long v. Hess, 154 Ill. 482,
40 N. E. 335; Castro -v. Illies, 22 Tex. 479, 73 Am. Dec. 277 (here the court Is
obviously misled by the analogies from the "tacit contract" doctrine) ; Fuss v.
Fuss, 24 Wis. 356, 1 Am. Rep. 180. But cf. Scheferling v. Huffman, 4 Oh. St.
241, 62 Am. Dec. 281.
8 Kleb v. Kleb, supra, note 33, and see Scherferling v. Huffman, supra, note 37..
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